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Abstract
No one credibly disputes that Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) were the victims
of genocide during the war of the early-90’s. This status is however
currently being used against them by their own ethnic political elite.
Former State-President Haris Silajdzic has shamelessly adopted the
‘political pose of victimhood’1 to further his own political agenda to the
detriment of those who genuinely deserve support and recognition.
Silajdzic has led the evolution of a post-war Bosniak identity based solely
upon this victim-status. In terms of post-war state-building and conflicttransformation progress is not just obstructed but entirely paralysed by the
hostile dynamic inherent in the absolute categories of victim:perpetrator.
If identity is premised solely upon victimhood then not only will a reduction
in perceived external threat jeopardise group solidarity but the identity
itself will be endangered by reconciliation with the persecutor. Such a
stance therefore precludes the possibility of engagement with the
allegedly still ‘sociocidal’2 Serbs on even unrelated issues leading to
political deadlock and socio-economic stagnation. Not only has the
continued abuse of Bosnia’s people by their own political elite resulted in
diminished life-chances for all ethnic groups; so too has international
silence on the issue led to a situation of conflict-exacerbation instead of
transformation in the last decade. I intend to describe the process and
motivation behind this political exploitation of victimhood in post-war
Bosnia, analyse its most pertinent consequences, and discuss the options
available to moderate this situation.
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It is important to make two things clear from the outset of this paper –
firstly that no attempt is being made to deny that Bosniaks were the
victims of genocide during the war of the early-90’s. Adequate truths
have been unearthed, often literally, and are now supported by several
judicial findings3 to render this fact beyond dispute. Leaving aside for now
discussion of the specific finding of genocide, the majority of individual
atrocities in the Bosnian war were committed against those deemed to
be by their attackers: Bosniak. Secondly, the topic under discussion is the
politicisation of victimhood not it’s political use per se. Politics is one of the
many forums where valid claims of victimhood and requests for redress
must be made. I will attempt to distinguish between the legitimate search
for justice however, and the political masquerade being perpetrated by
certain political elites in post-war Bosnia. This is vital since alignment with a
questionable political agenda allows detractors to question the integrity
of the real victims’ ongoing pursuit of justice. Furthermore the political
manipulation of victimhood is itself contributing to continued injustice
since the political deadlock it causes paralyses progress thus diminishing
life-chances for all ethnic groups.
This paper is derived from a larger study of the evolution of ethnonationalism in post-war Bosnia. It is clear, sixteen-years post-war, that
stubborn ideological barriers to communication obstruct peacebuilding
more so than physical minefields. It is widely acknowledged4 that leaders
such as Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman exploited the suffering,
real or mythical, of their constituents to consolidate & mobilise them for
their wartime aims. Identity-transformation strategies: strategies which
focus on changing the players, not just the rules of the game have
however been largely neglected by the post-war international presence
in BiH. Identity is intransigent but not immutable. The fact that international
peacemakers are the only group neglecting to engage with it post-war
means the mutual antagonism of ethno-national identities there has been
3
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allowed to metastasize. I will describe the process and motivation behind
this political exploitation of victimhood in post-war Bosnia, analyse its most
pertinent consequences, and discuss the options available to moderate
this situation.

The ‘Choice’ of a Victim Identity
Bosniaks began decrying political/territorial gains made by violence
during the war on the early 1990’s5. This was both morally legitimate and
an understandable attempt to counter attempts by Serb and
international powers alike to impute moral equivalence to the conflict
parties and therefore forestall intervention6. This same dynamic has
however carried over into the post-war era and lends a misleading moral
clarity to the actions of certain political elites, primarily the Stranka za
Bosnia-Hercegovina (SBiH – The Party for Bosnia-Hercegovina) and its
leader Haris Silajdzic.
Traditionally the least cohesive, and most contested of communities in
Bosnia during the war the Bosniaks sought a foci for identity as the
guardians of the country’s multi-ethnicity. This attempt at magnanimity
only survived the conflict in the form of sporadic veneers and
inconsistently enforced quotas delineated by the Dayton Peace
Agreement (DPA). Bosniak political parties now appeal to Bosniak voters
and Bosniak voters have been engaged in a search for a core identity.
Religious confession is a distinguisher insofar as Serbs are predominantly
Orthodox, and Croats largely Catholic, although both rely on historical
and pseudo-historical markers to fill-out their identities. However Bosniaks
are not only massively varied in their level of devotion to Islam but,
receiving little aid from Islamic countries during the war, are highly
sceptical of attempts to import foreign strains of the religion in the postwar period.
The Israeli historian Saul Friedländer wrote in 1987 of ‘the growing centrality
of the Shoah for Jewish communities in the Diaspora and that "The Shoah
is almost becoming a symbol of identification, for better or for worse,
whether because of the weakening of the bond of religion or because of
the lesser salience of Zionism and Israel as an identification element’7. Such
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a dynamic, albeit deliberately exaggerated, is currently in evidence in post-war
BiH. As a result an identity has been propagated by Bosniak power elites

centred around victimhood – leading to the arguably unique irony of
‘...Moslem leaders comparing themselves to Jews…’8. Indeed Silajdzic has
drawn repeated and explicit parallels between the Jewish experience at
Auschwitz-Birkenau and that of Bosniaks at Srebrenica, in addition to
tacitly comparing Serbs to Nazis9. Furthermore and of central significance
to the current political deadlock is Silajdzic’s frequent description, since
the 2007 International Court of Justice verdict10, of the Republika Srpska as
the product of genocide and/or ‘sociocide’11. I would contend that the
significance of the repeated emphasis oF the term ‘genocide’, as
opposed to ‘crimes against humanity’ or ‘war crimes’ is that there is an
element of overarching political direction and therefore responsibility
implied in the definition of genocide. Silajdzic has used this in an attempt
to render the guilty party’s political status forfeit. While qualitatively
individuals suffer just as obscenely when victims of crimes against
humanity as with genocide, the former legal category is frankly not so
politically expedient.
Like the majority of political parties in post-war Bosnia, the SBiH is
essentially a vehicle for the promotion of its leaders’ personal agenda.
With increasing stridence since its foundation the party has campaigned
to abolish the system designated in the DPA in favour of a centralised
state without the entities of the Republika Srpska or the Federation.
Despite ongoing political roadblocks preventing a post-war census, it is
possible that Bosniaks now comprise not just a plurality but outright
majority in post-war Bosnia. As a result many, on all sides, view Silajdzic’s
cries for ‘one-man, one-vote’ not as a genuine move to reunify a multiethnic country or even naïve posturing but a blatant attempt to establish
ethnic dominance12. It may be argued that, as the recent victims of
genocide a desire for political control amongst Bosniaks is more defensive
than offensive. However this is not a constitutional system that has ever, or
will ever, work in Bosnia and the suggestion thereof puts ethnic Serbs and
Croats permanently on the defensive.
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Silajdzic used opposition to the 2006 ‘April Package’ of Constitutional
Reforms, claiming they legitimised the RS, thereby ‘legalising genocide’13
to successfully re-launch his political career. His party now seeks to parlay
the 2007 ICJ verdict into a retroactive legal reason for the dissolution of
the Dayton-mandated Republika Srpska. This is based upon a legally
dubious interpretation of the International Law Commission’s Articles of
States’ Responsibility, adopted by the UN in 2001, that ‘No state shall
recognise as lawful a situation created by a serious breach of a
[peremptory norm of international law]’14.
Explaining Silajdzic’s Choice
Forefather of nationalism theory Ernest Renan observed that ‘suffering in
common unites people more than joy. In national memories, laments are
worth more than triumphs...’15. Indeed such are the cohesive powers of
shared suffering that it is unsurprising that Bosniak politicians have sought
recourse to it in order to ensure a receptive and united constituency postwar. While this is undoubtedly part of this discourse’s use by politicians in
the SDA such as Suleijman Tihic, it does not entirely explain the SBiH’s
actions. Former Bosnian High Representative Paddy Ashdown speculates
that Silajdzic is ‘deeply damaged’ by the government which he was part
of abandoning the safe haven of Srebrenica and is acting partially
therefore out of guilt16. However there are far more numerous and far less
worthy explanations for Silajdzic’s recent actions than a desire for
expiation. Considering the fact that he has ‘no record of achievement’17
since becoming a member of the state presidency for helping his
constituents, I would suggest these motives are far more accurate.
Adoption of the ‘political pose’ of victimhood has clear strategic benefits.
First amongst these is its effectiveness in silencing intra-ethnic critique of
Silajdzic’s actions; as independent journalist Tihomir Loza observes: ‘…how
exactly do you question someone promising to undo Srebrenica’s
tragedy? You just don’t?’18 Former Deputy-High Representative Graham
Day similarly notes parallels with the Israeli public relations book: ‘you
cannot criticize me I represent the voice of the holocaust’19. Political
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moderate and one of the few ethnic Serbs to be awarded a Golden Lily
for his service in the Bosnian army, Slavisa Sucur summarises this situation:
‘Creating the sense that the whole ethnic group is a collective victim
basically is a justification to do whatever you want... I strongly believe that
the guilt should be individualised, and the victimhood should be
individualised. The problem with fascism rising is one side has said ‘we are
the victims’ – no there are people who were victims. You are not the
victims – you were nobody before the war and now you have this and
that and so do people around you. You are not victims but there are
many people who are.’20
Similar vicarious attributions of stoicism, purity and strength for surviving at
all may also be imputed. All of which ultimately elevate the victim group
above bystanders and perpetrators even further; whether personally
deserved or simply claimed as an effect of group membership. As
American-Jewish journalist Ian Baruma admitted: ‘I am not the child of
Holocaust survivors. My mother was Jewish, but she lived in England, and
no immediate relations were killed by the Nazis. And yet even I couldn’t
escape a momentary feeling of vicarious virtue, especially when I came
across tourists from Germany.’21
Furthermore a reduction of the restraining impact of normative standards
on the victimised group is noted by philosopher Gareth Williams as in a
world which allowed such atrocity to occur there is perceived to be ‘no
meaningful prospect of outside accountability...’ and ‘Where
accountability fails, responsibility across time is all too likely to fail.’22 Little
effective oversight of the group’s actions is possible if no-one is perceived
as untainted enough to judge them. As Hannah Arendt warned: ‘We are
simply not equipped to deal, on a human, political level, with a guilt that
is beyond crime and an innocence that is beyond goodness or virtue...’23.
In the political arena such claims to absolute purity effectively removes
one from the same sphere as those interlocutors required in mundane
governance. This effect has even been observed to be transgenerational, further attenuating the claim. ‘The innocence and
vulnerability that characterize the Holocaust victim also characterises
modern Jews. Such an identity demands the presence of a Jewish state
(to protect the Jews) but also justifies the actions of the state as righteous
because they are being carried out by such a ‘pure’ people...’24.
20
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It is both a positive and understandable move for Bosniaks to seek to
define themselves more clearly post-war considering the extent to which
they suffered from the negative ascriptions of others during the conflict.
The direction that the SBiH has led them in in this regard however is not
contributing to individual life chances beyond those of a small political
clique, and in its appropriation by a political agenda obstructing the real
search for justice. The most significant harm inflicted by this political
manipulation of victimhood however is that the elites depending on this
platform for the continuance of their power arguably have a vested
interest in the continuing persecution of their own people. In Haris
Silajdzic’s case arguably his constituent’s continued suffering is in his best
interests since it allows him to…‘exploit his injury to excuse his failures’25.
Indeed it is acknowledged by international legal experts that genocide
and other conflicts are sometimes used ‘…to direct political pressure and
public attention away from leaders’ unable to meet minimum
commitments.’26 It is possible that the SBiH is one of the few to attempt
such political sleight-of-hand when on the receiving-end of such abuses
The SBiH members have been termed Foteljasi by critics meaning
‘armchair’ politicians – concerned solely with their own comfort and
enrichment27. Anecdotally too barbed paraphrases of the SBiH’s 2006
election slogan ‘100% BiH’ have entered pop culture; from commentators
describing the party’s performance as ‘Haris 100% neceg Silajdzic’ (100%
Nothing) and graffiti of ‘Haris 100% Izdaja’ (100% Betrayal) decorating the
walls of Sarajevo.
Lastly Silajdzic’s specific focus on Srebrenica is equally strategic and not
only, or even primarily, directed at his domestic audience. ‘The selfassigned status as the victim does not necessarily indicate weakness. On
the contrary, it provides strength vis-à-vis the international community,
which usually tends to support the vicitimised side...’28. Srebrenica was the
site of horrific violence during the war but frankly so too were many other
towns around Bosnia and the Krajina. What makes Srebrenica useful is its
status as the shibboleth of all international failings in BiH. A deserved
degree of guilt elicited by its name coupled with a tacit anti-Republika
25
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Srpska prejudice stemming from the acts of the war has kept the
international community silent during Silajdzic’s increasingly strident antientity pronouncements thereby heightening inter-ethnic tensions incountry to their current level.
The Republika Srpska and its political overlord Milorad Dodik have
received their fair, and sometimes unfair, share of condemnation for
acting contrary to the DPA. This distracts from the fact that, as far as calls
for territorial revanchism are concerned, the Bosniak political elite are
arguably now just as culpable. Whether through war-spawned guilt or a
conscious refusal to criticise one of the US-brokered Washington
Agreement’s offspring the Bosnian Muslim political elite are remarkably uncensured. This apparent bias exacerbates a further consequence of the
political adoption of a victimhood persona. While it may be a position
with significant ethico-political leverage attached it also lends itself to an
inherent passivity on the part of the Bosniaks. The SBiH clearly feel that the
onus is on an indicted international community to rectify the current
situation. Not only is such an attitude at odds with the requirements of
post-war rebuilding but so too is it massively unrealistic based upon the
international community’s increasingly desperate search for an exit
strategy in BiH.
The Implications of the Political Manipulation of Victimhood
Former-Knesset member Avraham Burg opined recently that his native
Israel has become ‘a nation of victims, and our state religion the worship
and tending of traumas…’29 In the Bosnian context Silajdzic’s worship of
trauma has several consequences, all are negative. Indeed activist and
vice-president of the non-nationalist party Nasa Stranka Maja Marjanovic
notes that in post-war Bosnia the only people benefiting from this
deadlocked status quo are the political elites who instigated it: ‘If we look
at the elections of 2006 – it is amazing how the big parties played-off each
other and secured votes...But when it translates into the everyday lives of
everyday people – it’s a catastrophe’30.
As regards issues of transitional justice, the political co-optation of
victimhood effectively gives would-be opponents an imperative to
undermine such claims. Whilst admittedly such claims may well be viewed
as legitimate political targets even without comprising the sole platform of
a competitor, they are guaranteed to be challenged if they are. In Bosnia
this has resulted in the increasing extremism of Silajdzic’s main antagonist
29
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Milorad Dodik to the point of genocide-denial. ‘We cannot and will never
accept qualifying that event [Srebrenica] as a genocide...’.31 Dodik has
also asked for a ‘recount’ of the reported number of victims of this
massacre, despite the original report actually being produced by his own
entity in 200432. The extent to which such repellent moves are made in
response to Silajdzic’s provocation is impossible to quantify precisely but
arguably the posture of a key rival is likely to be a significant motivation for
any political action. While Milorad Dodik is one of the most nimble of
politicians in BiH today, and may very well see Silajdzic’s pose for what it is,
the risk is of course that few others will see through their leader’s sophistry.
Furthermore, although always a salient issue in post-war Bosnia, the
heightened rhetoric since Silajdzic’s 2006 election to the state presidency
has intensified the ongoing absurd but damaging necrowar regarding
who can ‘boast’ the highest number of wartime victims. Kada Hotic, vicepresident of the Mothers of Srebrenica Association noted the irony that
nationalist politicians, despite professing to protect their own people, are
usually fairly pleased if they can claim to have incurred the greatest
ethnic body-count33. This has heightened the defensiveness of the already
suspicious Serbs to the point where Dragan Cavic, former RS-president
who laudably apologised for Srebrenica in 2004 lamented that in the
‘current climate it seemed like he had spoken in 2024 not 2004.’ 34 Indeed,
should Silajdzic’s successor Bakir Izetbegovic not relinquish this discourse
then the potential contribution to peacebuilding that the upcoming
Karadzic and Mladic verdicts may have is likely to suffer by association
with an regressive political agenda.
In addition to this detrimental impact on the general discourse of
transitional justice the political manipulation of victimhood has little
realistic prospect of righting the wrongs of genocide. Silajdzic’s legalistic
attempts to push the international community to abolish the entity system,
(a move which incidentally would remove the minimal protection the
Croat minority receives as part of the joint Croat-Bosniak Federation) are
utterly futile. The international community, even at its most united, has
never in post-war Bosnia shown the inclination to flex its muscles to that
degree. Indeed, as mention previously, in the past five years the primary
31

Dodik, M. (2010) Interview with Vecerni Novosti Newspaper reprinted in AFP Presse France April 27th
at http://www.france24.com/en/20100427-srebrenica-was-not-genocide-bosnian-serb-leader
32
Balkan Insight (2010) ‘Dodik Wants Review of Srebrenica Numbers’ April 9th at
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/dodik-wants-review-of-srebrenica-numbers
33
Private communication with author, Association of the Mothers of Srebrenica & Zepa, Sarajevo, BiH
25th August 2010.
34
Dragan Cavic interview with Lara J. Nettelfield and Sarah E. Wagner 13th July 2010 at
http://www.cambridgeblog.org/2010/10/the-fifteenth-anniversary-of-the-srebrenica-genocide-memorialvisit-to-srebrenica%E2%80%99s-crimes-scenes%E2%80%94part-three-of-a-series/

9

concern of all but European Union member states has been to depart.
The EU itself is also proving reticent on major constitutional reform
requirements for Bosnia’s accession, apparently hoping the impetus for
such changes will come from domestic sources.
In terms of domestic post-war state-building progress is not just obstructed
but entirely paralysed by the hostile dynamic inherent in the absolute
categories of victim: perpetrator. For example so ingrained in the political
and identity narrative of Israel has its victimhood become that even
contemporary political acts such as a moratorium on further settlements
are interpreted through this prism and felt as a further Shoah-related
injury35. If identity is premised solely upon victimhood then not only will a
reduction in perceived external threat jeopardise group-solidarity but the
identity itself will be fundamentally ‘imperilled by reconciliation with the
persecutor.’36 Such a stance therefore precludes the possibility of
engagement with the allegedly still ‘sociocidal’37 Serbs on even unrelated
issues. This political limbo has led to stalled social and economic
development a fact which may further exacerbate ethnic distance if
attributed to other ethnic groups rather than one’s own leaders ‘...the
more people suffered, the more they assigned collective guilt to the
group perceived as being responsible for their suffering.’38
Something which must also be monitored is the troubling paradox
sometimes observed amongst those who view themselves as victims
displaying a subsequent tendency to victimise others. Serbia, Israel, and
the US after September 11th are only the most obvious examples39. While
the Bosniak are not at this stage yet the effect that the constant repetition
of passivity, of being acted upon or done to can have on reducing
perceived personal responsibility needs considered. If a status created by
someone else is a central part of identity then almost any guilty act on the
victims’ part can be projected upon to the initial aggressor, effectively
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saying: ‘look what they have made us into’40. There is the possibility that
this logic could trigger further cycles of violence. Fears of repeated
persecution also possess an inherent dynamic: hostility is anticipated and,
if absent, projected and then used to affirm pre-emptive strikes. For
example: Arab opposition to Jewish settlement in Palestine was not based
on anti-Semitism yet ‘...blindness to this was one large cause of the failure
to find an effective accommodation between Arabs and Jews.’41
Discussion
The adoption of the political pose of victimhood is clearly politically
expedient but ultimately socially paralysing. In December 2008 Suleiman
Tihic, the only major political party leader who was personally the victim of
serious war crimes called on his fellow Bosniaks to abjure ‘the philosophy
of victimhood and self-pity’42. This cry to reclaim a sense of personal
agency; perhaps to challenge the ascription of an identity either by those
who committed violent acts or political leaders who have exploited and
therefore compounded this must be considered. Occupying the position
of eternal victim effectively puts the power, this time of apology, in the
hands of those perceived as wrong-doers. Perhaps in becoming an active
forgiver of others rather than waiting for a, possibly permanently withheld,
apology would be a more positive identity for Bosniaks struggling to
situate themselves in post-war Bosnia. If however it is in their leaders’
interest to keep them perpetually labelled as victims then Bosniaks may
never receive adequate support to come to terms with their survival; their
empowerment and the reconstruction of their self-esteem appears
counter to the interests of those supposed to represent them.
It is worth asking if the political elite who have consciously cultivated this
pose of victimhood have actually led their own people into an
ideological cul-de-sac where the only way of healing their own pain is by
relinquishing their ethnic identity – one of the few things which has
survived the war. Have Haris Silajdzic and the SBiH effectively imprisoned
Bosniaks between a place of suffering or extinction in a way that Karadzic,
Milosevic and Tudjman never managed?
40
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Some Possible Options
One pathway is found in the strategy of a relatively new party. Nasa
Stranka (‘Our Party’) describe themselves as ‘post-ideological’ in that their
platform is social justice, however they do not attempt to claim they live in
a post-nationalist or a-nationalist community, or ask members to relinquish
strongly held identities. They simply state that identity politics are not
actually relevant to the improvement of life-chances in post-war Bosnia43.
Holding that the majority of the population’s interests are neither onedimensional nor fundamentally opposed44, NS believe that the key to
changing the political status quo in Bosnia depends upon emphasising
commonality of interest not difference of identity. This approach arguably
displaces ethno-nationalism from the political arena, rather than seeking
to transform its content per se. However considering the current situation
this would be a massive improvement.
Depoliticising identity in Bosnia will not be easy – as NS’s relatively weak
electoral performance to-date indicates - yet it is feasible. Indeed Daniel
Byman, concurs that ‘Identity change policies can bypass group status
concerns by appealing directly to individuals who compose the group.’45
There is certainly a constituency for such an approach: a 2009 UNDP
survey found that fewer than 25% of respondents state-wide believed that
only ethno-nationalist political parties could protect their interests46.
Simultaneously 76% of those polled across the country reported high levels
of pride in belonging to their ethnic group47. This may indicate that NS’s
strategy of not minimising identity just highlighting its irrelevance to most
significant issues such as pensions, employment, healthcare and
education could find support.
In lieu of domestic leaders who eschew such ideological manipulation, or
a robust civil society to lobby for justice outside the central political arena
what can be done? The onus falls on the international community to
accept that neither their tribunal nor the elections they have sponsored
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are adequate to create peace BiH, indeed both tainted by the games
being played on-the-ground.
Indeed the structural, elite-focused approach that has been employed is
the standard operating procedure of the post-WWII international
community, but it has been criticised by the school of conflict
transformation for being inadequate to entrench sustainable peace and
for being readily undermined by its neglect of social and cultural
reconstruction48. Johan Galtung included for the first time the psychosocial elements of conflict, arguing that these are as significant as the
more objective components, and that conflict transformation must
involve all levels of society not only the elite49.
Considering the continued problems with the institutional-ideological
interaction encountered by the international presence in Bosnia there are
reasons to ask if the adoption of a more transformative approach,
specifically one that minimises the influence of power-elites or weakens
their ideological armoury, would have fared better. Firstly, these elites
have, through daily political practice in Bosnia, been a powerful post-war
hindrance to peace. Neither the elite-bargaining imperative of the
consociational model nor the centripetal incentives of the integrative
approach have managed to produce the desired moderation in the
stance of domestic political elites. Secondly, conflict transformation theory
indicates that failure to engage with the underlying causes of conflict will
mean that relationships are unlikely to be sufficiently transformed to
embed peace50. Indeed we have seen that, left unmoderated,
relationships can be manipulated post-war to actually exacerbate the
conflict.
Unfortunately beyond cosmetic dabbling with flags, licence plates and
mute national anthems the international community has undertaken no
process akin to the symbolic and ideological denazification of WWII or the
disestablishment of Japanese Shintoism and its nationalist constellations51.
Indeed ‘Bosnian’ is not even an identity-category recognised in state
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legal documents52 leaving no choice but to subscribe to one ethnic
group for any political participation. Considering the conditions extant in
1995, it may have been impossible to find an alternative starting point to
Dayton’s ethno-nationalist fiefdoms53. But the current impasse may have
been avoided through a subsequent consistency in at least one element
of the international approach: Accept the centrality of ethno-nationalism
in the conflict but then undertake some degree of ideological
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in the post-war era. Events
since 1995, and most clearly since 2006, indicate that un-reconstructed
ethno-nationalist ideology jeopardises any progress made.
Van Evera, although more sceptical than Kalyvas, notes that while
wholesale transformation is implausible in a post-conflict context it might
be possible to minimise the malignancy of certain identities. ‘Serbs will be
Serbs and Croats will be Croats. Neither will assimilate to being something
else. But Serb and Croat nationalism can be tempered into something
more benign.’ 54 How then could such a reformation be undertaken?
While it is an imperfect solution the much-debated yet never-actualised
Bosnian Truth Commission may be a means to expose some of the
instrumentalism surrounding ethno-nationalist discourse in Bosnia. It would
also obviate the need for the international community to effectively
weigh-in on nationalist ideology something they are apparently
uncomfortable with. Furthermore the degree to which the international
community would have to be directly involved in a truth commission is not
necessarily proportionate to the benefit it may gain in terms of stability
and the achievement of an exit-option. The academic debate
surrounding ‘peace versus justice’ tends to view truth commissions and
criminal trials as largely exclusive55. However, if the structural and psychosocial must both be considered in post-war conflict-regulation strategies
then such distinctions may have to be overcome. While the international
community both instituted the Hague tribunal and sponsored domestic
hybrid war crimes trials, the third-party imposition of truth commissions is
rare.
As one of the key problems encountered in post-war Bosnia is the reliance
of elected politicians on mutually hostile ethno-nationalisms then
52

Author interview with Marjanovic Ibid.
Author’s personal communication with Paddy Ashdown, Bath 10th September 2010
54
van Evera, S. (2001) ‘Primordialism Lives!’ APSA-CP: Newsletter of the Organized Section p21 &
Kalyvas, S. (2008) ‘Ethnic Defection and Civil War’ Comparative Political Studies 41(8):1043-1068
55
Villa-Vicencio, C. (2010) ‘Inclusive Justice: The Limits of Trial Justice and Truth Commissions’ in
Chandra Sriram & Suren Pillay, eds. Peace Versus Justice: The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa.
Rochester: James Curry Press
53

14

removing or at least minimising the role of these elected officials may
perhaps also prove beneficial. The extension of international supervision
and election moratoriums are not a new suggestions, indeed this was
successfully attempted for sometime in Brcko56. However the OHR Head of
Political Affairs, and longest-serving international official in Bosnia, Archie
Tuta admits it was never considered countrywide due to an international
aversion to accusations of imperialism57. Tuta views this aversion as
regrettable considering the measures the international community had to
eventually adopt anyway to deal with nationalist obstruction, noting we
should have been ‘braver, sooner’58. Similarly political advisor to the
European Commission Delegation Elisabeth Tomasinac admits that
perpetually avoiding engagement with ethno-nationalists has effectively
stored-up trouble for a time when the international presence is exhausted
and the EU unwilling to provide a suitably muscular replacement59 .
Potential political cover for postponing elections may be found in the fact
that it is now widely agreed that the immediate period after the signing of
the DPA was devoted to physical reconstruction rather than statebuilding60 and there was therefore little for elected politicians to do other
than consolidate nationalist enclaves.
Ultimately, although only taking the Bosniaks as an example herein, the
changes in ethno-nationalist identity in the post-war period are such that
we must consider the international non-intervention therein a failure.
Unrestrained these ideologies have been used to perpetuate ethnic
power cliques to the detriment of the general populace and international
attempts at peacebuilding. Whether this will prompt a change in
international behaviour is unknown, but it would seem that without some
amelioration of ethno-nationalism, Bosnia faces a miserable future.
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